driven by the rapid turn-over of electronic technologies. These impacts include the costs and schedule implications of managing parts obsolescence on high technology Navy systems. This obsolescence occurs as commercial electronics manufacturers replace current component production with newer, more capable products. Navy ships are increasingly composed of complex electronics technology and rely almost totally on the commercial electronics industry for its parts. During the period required to develop and produce a Navy ship and its major systems, the electronic components will have gone through several life cycles, creating a tremendous workload for the ship's prime and subcontractors. Replacing these components over the life of the platform, when those components are no longer available commercially, magnifies the obsolescence impacts.
CAPT Kerr specifically asked forr students from the Electronics Seminar to study the phenomena of Moore's Law, the industry bench mark for the rate that electronic chip capability advances, and to provide a projection of how long this trend will continue. In addition, he asked the Electronics Seminar to assess the impacts to the commercial world's costs and schedules, and in turn, the cost and schedule impacts to Government systems.
Two students divided the work into two parts. The first part entails a detailed study of Moore's Law through discussions with companies, industry associations, Government, and academia. The second area focuses on determining how Government and industry currently manage obsolescence, or frequently referred to as Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS or DMS for short).
Government and industry experts representing some of the latest weapon systems and commercial systems were asked to describe their DMS programs as well as their costs.
This report summarizes these findings and identifies a number of experts, should CAPT Kerr and others on his team desire additional information.
Executive Summary
Moore's Law: The number of transistors that can be placed on a micro-circuit doubles every 18-24 months, resulting in a rapid turnover in generations of microcircuits.
There are almost as many opinions about the how long Moore's Law will be applicable as there have been technological advances since the Law was first annunciated in 1965.
The majority of industry experts, however, believe that the physical limits of silicon based advancements will be reached by the end of the decade. Microelectronics obsolescence will remain a challenge as industry and academia alike are hard at work on marketing post-silicon applications. New atomic compounds, such as gallenium arsenide and ferritin, may replace silicon substrates within integrated circuits, while entirely new technologies like quantum computing may transform the entire industry. The point is that while Moore's Law will end relatively soon, innovation will not--and DoD program managers (PM) will still have to manage obsolescence.
What is obsolescence? As electronic semi-conductor, sub-component, and component manufacturers rapidly develop new, more capable products, the older products are no longer profitable to build and sustain, particularly at the small quantities the Government purchases. This forces management to "buy-out" up front, all the parts needed for the life of the program, or to redesign/re-qualify the parts, or to find other sources. For large systems, such as the F/A-22, hundreds of parts become obsolete each year and are referred to as Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS or DMS for short). DMS impacts not only acquisition and support costs, but, mission capability and war readiness as well.
Industry and Government Management Practices:
The Air Force, Navy, and Army DMS Program Offices are responsible for distributing DMS guidance and providing expert support to weapon system Program Offices. They work to insure each program office has a trained, knowledgeable DMS focal point armed with tools and databases to help manage DMS issues. We strongly recommend every weapon system program office contact their service's DMS Program Office as they begin preparations for the development phase and periodically throughout the program's lifecycle. For industry, the Government Electronics Industry Association (GEIA) has developed a comprehensive guidance document, GEB1 ( www.dmea.osd.mil/gebl paper.pdf) that provides a thorough overview of DMS problems and potential solutions. GEB 1 stresses a combination of proactive and reactive measures to minimize the cost and schedule impacts resulting from DMS. GEB1 is well worth the Government program office leaders' and DMS focal point's time to read and understand.
Case Studies: We selected programs that were comparable in size' and complexity to Capt Kerr's programs, and whose contacts were readily available for consultation. These included the F-15 Radar Upgrade, the F/A-22, the Joint Strike
Fighter (F-35) , and the AEGIS DMS Program. Air Force and Navy program offices are moving toward the commercial approach to managing DMS. This means delegating responsibility to (and paying) the prime contractor to manage the bulk of the DMS program. This includes establishing proactive measures, such as designing parts and systems with architectures that are more resistant to DMS; i.e., they are backward compatible, and selecting components at the front end of their life cycles, thus extending the time before they become obsolete. The JSF program has gone one step further by authorizing subcontractors to change and upgrade parts as long as they conform to form, fit, function, and interface requirements, plus, incentivizing contractors to upgrade components to achieve affordability and supportability goals. Prime contractors direct the suppliers to provide advance notice for parts or components that they have decided to no longer produce. Advanced notification allows the suppliers and primes time to search for alternative measures to obtain parts. Prime contractors have established databases for their DMS parts and search other databases, including industry associations, so that synergies can be obtained to help resolve DMS issues. Both commercial and military prime contractors have developed efficient and effective procedures for tracking, reporting, and resolving DMS issues and risks.
DMS Management Costs:
Annual DMS management costs for major programs such as the F/A-22, run approximately $100M/year. This cost includes the program management, Integrated Product Teams (IPT), and supplier costs to resolve hundreds of DMS cases. DMS costs are much lower for fielded systems, such as the F-15, or, for systems early in development, such as the JSF. It is difficult to determine the equivalent DMS costs in commercial industry because they delegate nearly total responsibility to their suppliers, who have life-time responsibility for supporting their products, i.e., as long as there are aircraft in the field, the supplier is responsible for insuring its systems are supported. In these instances the DMS costs are included into the component "price".
In our professional judgement, the more commercial like the Government can make its DMS program, the less it will cost and less risk will be experienced.
Analysis of Moore's Law
Moore's Law was coined back in 1965 when Intel co-founder Gordon Moore observed that the semiconductor industry would be able to double the number of transistors on a single microprocessor every 18 to 24 months. As the number of transistors doubles, so does the speed. This rate of change has occurred with such consistency that it has become the standard that semiconductor companies, or "chipmakers", have almost religiously ascribed. And the result, while beneficial to application entrepreneurs and public consumers, has exacerbated the weapon system business. In addition to long development and production lead times, DoD PMs must also account for system sustainability and multiple generations of technological advances over the typical decades-plus life of a weapon system (see attachment 1). Faced with an increasingly irrelevant DoD customer base (Defense accounts comprise only .03 percent of the US semiconductor business), the industry finds it unprofitable to maintain a repair and replacement infrastructure for legacy technology. eventually "combine digital, analog, and microelectromechanical particles all on a single chip," 14 and thereby increase capability by orders of magnitude.
Of all the proposed initiatives to further shrink transistors, the most revolutionary and risky involve subatomic application. From the previously mentioned molecular transistors to using carbon-based nanotubes as gates in the new chip design, scientists strive to isolate parts of atoms for use in future transistors. 15 But the truly new paradigm of quantum computing as the basis of chip design is wherein lies the greatest potential.
In essence, quantum computing encompasses the theory that split atoms can work as "quantum switches" and simultaneously rest at both on and off, i.e., represented by 1 and 0 (as opposed to conventional switches which can represent either, but not both 1 or 0 By most estimates, including Moore's, there will be a significant gap between the halt of silicon-based transistor shrinkage and assembly line manufacturing of synthetic, organic or subatomic transistors. How many years the gap will encompass is anyone's guess, but estimates indicate the timeframe somewhere between 2028-2050. $ Along the way, the industry will make improvements on the margins, but there just may be a chance for the Defense Department to catch up. By wisely using the 2010-2028 window, PMs can design weapon system contracts with vendors who concurrently sell silicon-based
ICs and invest in state-of-the-art alternatives, betting that these companies will be too capital-dependent upon the silicon infrastructure to readily forego system sustainability.
18 Jack Robertson, "Moore's Law Namesake Predicts IC Density Growth Could Slow", EBN, Jul 15, 2002, p. 10 While the decade of the 201 Os should allow a degree of temporary respite from transistor advancements, if there's anything the previous 38 years of Moore's law have taught, it's that you can't totally bet against it (in concept at least). Thus, PMs will also have to restructure the ways in which they manage DMS.
Government and Industry Management Practices GEB 1
Under the umbrella Government Electronics and Information Technology Association (GEIA), federal and industry experts outlined several technological and program management techniques to offset DMS. While the following general prescription won't apply to each and every DoD weapon system, several key case studies prominently highlight critical practices that mitigated this problem--in turn ensuring longer system performance and reducing taxpayer burden.
Arguably the most important goal for DoD PMs and contractors alike to aspire to is to be proactive! The period when a weapon is well underway in production or even operational is not the time to realize that DMS threatens the system's sustainability. By artfully combining thorough industry research and anticipatory tactics, the government can get the jump on the five major aspects of obsolete technology.
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Predominant effects of DMS:. Any brief list of the primary difficulties surrounding electronics within Defense weapon systems must place the non-availability of parts at the top. As contractors, subcontractors and researchers all transition to new technologies, the "simple" aspect of locating obsolete components needed to repair still- The result is that many components can be upgraded vice replaced, thus reducing the overall DMS costs.
Software specific solutions:
PMs also need to insist on software development that enables execution independent of the host platform. By obliging contractors to employ portable code at the weapon system's inception, or at least migrate to portability during the early stages of production, government can avoid having to totally redesign and replace software when hardware components become obsolete. Industry experts contributing to the GEIA study emphasized that pre-production portability is desired, as changing source code midstream in a system's life will often prove too costly.
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Other solutions: GEB 1 provides a thorough description of the various alternative solutions to DMS issues. One tactic the government has increasingly taken advantage of is the aftermarket producer category. Identifying and contracting with firms that will deliver components after their technology has passed by is a relatively low cost strategy. Component substitution, while often a challenge to integration, and more
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Ibid 23 Ibid, p. 4 expensive than finding an alternative source, is another approach used to mitigate DMS.
And when workable substitutes are unavailable, system developers often turn to emulation. By designing and building replacements for obsolete ICs, engineers "emulate" the electronic make-up of the chips without the heavy expenses incurred in a fab. 24 Obviously, there is significant risk as the emulated circuits must guarantee the same level of performance and be manufactured in sufficient numbers to achieve economies of scale that offset the design costs. As with all of these options, emulation represents a potential workaround to the problem of DMS. Arguably the best approach is to construct the original contract in a manner that anticipates, and subsequently manages, the inevitability of DMS. This acquisition strategy contracts suppliers to proactively support their products for the life of the weapon system, and is starting to be factored into recent DoD programs.
Air Force and Navy DMS Program Office Guidance
The -recommending policy and procedures at the appropriate levels of the Air Force and DoD.
-ensuring implementation of DMS programs and procedures at the Field Activities located at the Air Logistic Centers and at System Program Offices (SPO) located at the Product Centers.
-interfacing with various organizations within Government (OSD & all services, DLA, JLC-GIDEP, DMEA) and industry for information sharing and to participate in working groups targeted to problem identification and resolution.
-providing tools and limited training to the Air Force DMS community. Office has developed the Case Resolution Guide to provide a greater understanding of the steps involved in identifying and addressing DMS issues. It is described under the "tools and training" section below.
Implementation: The DMS Program Office works with Acquisition and
Logistics DMS Managers to implement the management planning and processes to insure they manage "proactively" vs. "reactively". Some program offices, like the F/A-22 and the JSF, have delegated DMS management responsibility to their contractors. Other programs, such as the F-15, maintain management responsibility within the Government.
Either way, the DMS Program Office will help assess DMS program needs based on program complexity, budget, and management philosophy. Based on their needs, specific DMS programs and procedures can be selected and implemented.
"Reactive" DMS programs are characterized as performing limited up-front planning. The bulk of their activity is responding to notices from suppliers or other agencies, often with limited lead-time, that parts will no longer be produced. Then they initiate a series of activities to resolve the problem. Over the life of the program, the numbers of problems will multiply and the extent of the problems will become greater, not only becoming more difficult and costly to manage, but also resulting in degraded mission capability. On the other hand, "Proactive" managed programs require significant upfront investments and planning, not only establishing contacts, but creating design processes and architectures to minimize the occurrence of DMS events and to be postured to readily mitigate their impacts. Proactive p ocesses will help reduce total ownership costs and schedule risks improving mission r adiness. 
Tools and

Product Redesigns:
If the supplier believes a redesign is the appropriate option to deal with a DMS issue, it will provide its recommendation to BCAG. BCAG has final approval rights on Category 1 changes, which I believe are similar to Military class 1 engineering changes--affects form, fit or function. Otherwise, the supplier is free to make changes. If the supplier decides to incorporate a product improvement to resolve a DMS issue, any associated cost savings are shared between the prime and the supplier. All changes are funded through the supplier's overhead accounts.
In the commercial airline industry, the airline company (customer) is rarely involved in DMS management activities, unlike military customers who control funding, determine maintenance concepts, make final decisions on equipment redesigns and establish other requirements as necessary. The aircraft systems integrator has more flexibility to work DMS issues in the commercial world. Tanemura identified many opportunities for achieving synergy between the commercial and military DMS management practices; however, due to unique constraints on military programs, some may be difficult to achieve. In addition it appears that many of these may be appropriate for Boeing commercial and military Divisions to cooperate, as opposed to organizations belonging to different companies. Some opportunities include:
-Developing a standardized subcontractor parts management approval process that addresses DMS management requirements.
-Establishing a common DMS database and maximizing information sharing.
-Creating DMS forums to promote commercial and military information sharing.
-Provide planning and tools to enable joint DMS problem recognition and problem solving opportunities.
-Establishing mechanisms to combine military and commercial efforts to improve low volume procurements.
-Establishing common guidelines for DMS substitution.
-Verifying military requirements to insure operating systems are not over-specified, enabling commercial alternatives.
-Adopting commercial procurement and maintenance practices, including using multiyear contracting and life-time product support agreements, 2-level maintenance and incorporating maintenance incentives.
Commercial practices provide many opportunities for military DMS managers.
Unfortunately, Tanemura's briefing did not contain cost comparisons.
DMS Case Studies F-15 Radar Upgrade
The government and industry effectively combined several coping strategies to offset DMS concerns with the F-15 Eagle's key APG-63 tracking radar. Manufactured by Hughes (now Raytheon), the APG-63 is a lightweight, highly digitized X-band pulse doppler radar with numerous ICs. Now over 30 years old, the APG-63 faced DMSderived obsolescence a long time ago. In the mid 1990's the SPO at Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, Georgia and the key contractors, McDonnell-Douglas (now Boeing) and Hughes embarked on a versatile campaign plan to upgrade the radar and maintain the F-15s superiority as an air-to-air weapon system.
Initially, the government-industry team conducted a thorough cost analysis, weighing the merits of designing/building a replacement system versus upgrading the current APG-63. Hughes sponsored multiple manufacturers to design radar component prototypes in a successful effort to identify less expensive options. 25 Next, using a building block approach, they decided to proceed with the best of both options; replace the old radar with a new system, the APG-63V ( that the SPO gave LM the authority to make decisions regarding managing and resolving DMS issues. LM uses web-based management systems to manage and communicate status and issues. LM levies a contractual requirement to all its major suppliers to identify in advance any components that will no longer be manufactured. This requirement consists of a complete set of instructions for reporting issues and the process for developing alternate sources, proposing buy-outs, and developing alternate designs.
Once the supplier has identified a DMS problem to the LM DMS program manager, the supplier will work with the appropriate LM and SPO Integrated Product
Team (IPT) to prepare and present a trade study to decide the appropriate course of action. The goal is to provide timely identification allowing production of new components one-year before the obsolete parts run out. DMS components with at least one year overlap are rated satisfactory or green, those with less than one year are rated moderate risk or yellow, and finally those without any overlap, i.e., those projected to cause a gap in production are rated high risk or red. 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) DMS Program
The JSF (F-35) DMS program is a subset of its overall Technical Refreshment Program (TRP) which is described in its comprehensive TRP Plan. The TRP seeks to achieve weapon system affordability/supportability and to minimize DMS risks through proactive DMS management measures, using commercial approaches and standards, and incentivizing contractors to achieve program goals.
The JSF program is currently entering the Preliminary Design Review stage and therefore hasn't experienced any significant DMS issues, yet. The JSF DMS program is similar to the F/A-22 DMS program in many respects. The JSF SPO in Crystal City (Arlington), VA has delegated responsibility to the prime contractor, which manages the program with its suppliers. Lockheed Martin, Ft. Worth, TX (LM) is populating its databases with electronic bills of materials, supplier action-plans and forecasts, and will be interfacing with the Lockheed corporate DMS data bases. LM has a relatively brief statement of work defining its responsibility and activity it provided for the SPO; however, they have levied detailed and very specific instructions to its major suppliers.
LM delegates even more responsibility to their JSF suppliers than LM has on the F/A-22 program. Similar to the commercial aerospace industry, the JSF suppliers are responsible for ensuring product supportability, reliability, affordability and availability throughout the operational life of the JSF. While all major suppliers are included, the primary focus is on the micro-electronic suppliers whose product technologies change frequently. The suppliers follow proactive design measures to minimize DMS impacts and in the case of a DMS issue, have full authority to make changes that do not affect the form, fit, function, or interface (F31) characteristics. Since the suppliers are incentivized to insure part supportability and affordability, they will continuously seek opportunities to introduce new technologies to achieve these goals.
The suppliers are required to notify LM within 2 years of effectivity, if a DMS, or an affordability opportunity will result in a design change that affects F31. Additionally, the suppliers are required to submit an action plan describing the proposed solution and to update these plans every six months. Issues and plans are brought to the attention of the product IPTs who will be responsible for working with the suppliers to reach a decision on the proper course of action. The Tech Refresh/DMS team operate at the Air System level overseeing all the air vehicle, autonomic logistics, and training systems IPTs.
Michael Mullins, the LM leader of the DMS Tech Refresh Team, indicated that funding DMS & Tech Refresh related activities in subsequent lots is his greatest concern.
In some DMS cases, suppliers should place orders and buy new parts for future lots.
However, since the Government provides annual year funding, these orders will be disrupted, thereby impacting potential cost savings, supportability, and increasing schedule risks. Since the program is still early in development, he hopes to find ways to resolve this issue. In addition, Mullns is working with the Navy's Supply-Chain
Practices for Affordable Navy Systems (SPANS) program (www.spans.org) to strengthen the supply-chain through technology projects, and maintains contact with DMEA to keep abreast of DMS best practices.
The LM-Northup Grumman-BAE Tech Refresh Team is comprised of 7 people who are primarily working planning and administrative issues at this time. Therefore, the Tech Refresh and DMS costs are currently very limited.
Points of Contact:
-LMCO DMS focal point: Michael Mullins, Lockheed Supplier Management ( Tel: 817-763-4988 or michael.p.mullins@lmco.com).
-JSF DMS focal point: LtCol Jim Geurts, USAF F-35 Mission Systems IPT Lead
AEGIS DMS Program
Another good example of DMS management involves the Navy's Surface Warfare PM's relationship with industry for acquisition and upgrades of the AEGIS cruisers and destroyers. By almost completely charging the prime contractor, Lockheed
Martin-Eagan (LM), with the task of combating obsolescence, NAVSEA PMs continue to keep near state-of-the-art ships afloat.
LM's DMS-coping strategy begins with the development of a technology roadmap that emphasizes true system requirements vs. rigid adherence to military specifications. The LM PM forms an industry version of an IPT (called "COTS Working
Conclusion
In the best of times, the (937-904-4374) 
